Operation Menace Read online

  Naval Warfare

  Outside

  The Pacific

  Operation ‘MENACE’

  The assault on Dakar.

  By

  M. J. Bourne

  Naval Warfare Outside the Pacific:

  Operation ‘Menace’: the assault on Dakar

  Copyright M J Bourne 1996

  2nd edition published 2010 by

  Vandering Publications

  29 Dumfries St,

  Barrow-in-Furness

  Cumbria

  LA14 2DA

  All rights reserved.

  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the copyright holder.

  Introduction

  In September of 1939 Britain and France went to war as allies against the common threat of Nazi Germany. Just twelve months later the erstwhile partners were reluctantly shooting at each other. The reasons were complex.

  During the mid-war years Britain's Royal Navy had been run down to an astonishing degree. Although it remained the largest in the world, this had only been achieved by arbitrarily increasing the service life of individual vessels and thus avoiding the necessity of building many new ships. Even with this "program slippage", for the first time in 150 years it became official Royal Navy policy to rely on allies for undoubted naval superiority over potential enemies. The French navy, which had been revitalised by the energetic leadership of Admiral Darlan, was an integral part of this policy now that the Italians had openly sided with the Axis.

  The military situation in France by mid June of 1940 had become so grave that French Premier Reynaud considered that he would have to ask for an armistice, in spite of admonitions from hotheads like General de Gaulle. Rather shamefacedly Reynaud consulted with his allies before approaching the Germans. The British Government, for their part, understood the situation perfectly. They agreed that France should submit, for they realised that the French army was incapable of further resistance. The French navy, however, was a different matter altogether. It had not collapsed like the army had. For example, French naval officers had successfully evacuated all ships capable of steaming from the Channel and Biscay ports. Some had headed for Britain, but the majority had sailed for the French colonies in Africa. If the French were now to become non-belligerents the balance of power at sea would shift markedly, especially in the Mediterranean. The Royal Navy, with its fleets based at Alexandria and Gibraltar, would be both heavily outnumbered and divided by the centrally positioned Italians.

  The new French Government, based at the town of Vichy under the old hero Marshal Petain, negotiated as best it could. The final conditions of the Armistice with regard to the French fleet were in fact rather lenient. Apart from ships needed for colonial defence, the navy was to be retained in French owned ports and disarmed under German supervision. The Nazis took over a few coastal defence ships and minesweepers but undertook not to seize the bulk of the fleet for their own use. Darlan, who had become minister of marine as well as Commander in Chief in the new Vichy government, gave his solemn word to Churchill that the fleet would never be allowed to fall into German hands (and did in fact issue secret orders to his commanders to that effect).

  Notwithstanding these assurances, few strategists in London believed that if the Germans decided to seize the ships there was much chance that they would fail. This could not be allowed to happen if Britain was to be taken at all seriously in its determination to continue the war. These ships could give the Axis virtual equality at sea. Accordingly, the British began to draw up plans to neutralise French naval forces.

  On July 3rd armed parties silently boarded and seized French warships in Plymouth and Portsmouth. Simultaneously, French ships in Alexandria agreed to disarm themselves after diplomatic representations by Admiral Cunningham. At Dakar in West Africa several powerful elements of the Vichy fleet, the centrepiece being the modern battleship Richelieu, ignored a British ultimatum to either join the Royal Navy, scuttle or disarm. Consequently, on July 8th aircraft from the light carrier Hermes torpedoed the Richelieu, and that night a depth charge planted under her stern by a small boat further damaged her. Satisfied that the giant warship had been neutralised for at least the foreseeable future, the British withdrew.

  But these diverse successes were largely nullified by disaster at Mers el-Kebir near Oran. Here a similar ultimatum to that delivered at Dakar was also rebuffed and with much reluctance force was used. British warships bombarded the port and the ships in the harbour. Three battleships were destroyed and 1400 French sailors killed. Even then a fourth battleship, together with its escorts, managed to evade the British and reach Toulon. Not surprisingly these events caused enormous animosity towards the British throughout the French Navy. Active collaboration with the Germans increased. Recruits to the fledgling Free French movement dried up almost immediately.

  Oran was an enormous embarrassment to General de Gaulle, who had fled to London and was planning to mobilise a French army from the many thousands who had been evacuated from Dunkirk and Norway. Nevertheless he persevered and by early August the Free French movement was 7000 strong and had been recognised by the British Parliament as an Ally, having national autonomy under British command. The Vichy Government bitterly denounced all these British actions and broke off diplomatic relations. For good measure, they also declared de Gaulle to be a traitor and a renegade. He was found guilty in absentia by a Military Tribunal and sentenced to death.

  In spite of this, encouraging messages of support soon began to reach de Gaulle, especially from France’s then extensive colonial empire. There was evidence that a large proportion of colonial officials were lukewarm in their support of the Vichy Government. After all, many of these colonies lay next to British territories that they were dependant on for trade. The North African colonies were too susceptible to German influence and the Pacific ones were too far away, but the West African colonies - Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey - could become a base for the Free French movement, and a powerful springboard for a return to Europe. De Gaulle's eyes began to turn to West Africa, and in particular to its capital, Dakar.

  The town of Dakar was of immense strategic importance. Situated on the westernmost point of the African continent, it was the eastern end of the shortest trans-Atlantic route. It had an international airfield, one of the best ports in Africa, and a large naval base. It was strongly fortified and would be of great value in holding the west Atlantic sea routes. Conversely, in Axis hands it would be an ideal base from which to attack the important sea communications between Britain and the Cape.

  Dakar was also a rallying point for the sparsely settled West African colonies. The governor of West Africa, Boisson, had moved the entire colonial administration there. A tough and popular leader, he was carrying out an energetic campaign against Free French sympathisers, many of whom had been arrested. Nevertheless messages of support continued to reach de Gaulle. The morale of the Vichy garrison was reported to be low. There had even been a mutiny amongst some of the sailors.

  In mid July of 1940 de Gaulle put forward a proposal to land at Konakry in French Guinea with a small force and march inland, gathering support as he went. His force would then swing north and approach Dakar from inland, cutting the supply routes. This would emphasise the French nature of the operation, and reduce the possibility of bloodshed.

  It was a bold plan but it underestimated the difficulties of moving through Africa (of which de Gaulle knew nothing) and also the possibility of Vichy intervention. De Gaulle was forced to admit he would need help and modified his proposal to include a Royal Navy blockade of Dakar.
On August 3rd Churchill cautiously approved the idea.

  Then, at a meeting on August 6th, the British Prime Minister unexpectedly put forward an altered plan of action. His reasoning was that although the rewards of occupying Dakar were enormous, so too were the risks. A failed attempt could provide the Germans with the excuse they needed to seize all French bases, which would be a blow to Britain’s cause. The Americans in particular would not be impressed. There was also the possibility that a repetition of the Oran debacle might push the Vichy government into a declaration of war. The French forces in North Africa were formidable, including 70 submarines and over 600 combat aircraft. If Vichy were to openly side with the Axis (which privately Churchill thought unlikely) the British position in the Middle East would become untenable. The originally conceived operation would take weeks or even months to execute, which would increase the tension between the British and Vichy. Besides the Royal Navy simply did not have enough ships to impose a blockade for such a length of time. Any operation would instead have to be short and decisive.

  Churchill’s vision was of a huge Allied fleet arriving off Dakar, intimidating the local population. An envoy would be dropped, bearing a note pressuring the governor—either cooperate, or face overwhelming odds. Only if this did not work would landings be made. De Gaulle accepted the modified plan, principally because he was anxious to avoid a Frenchman versus Frenchman fight. With these constraints, on August 7th Operation "Menace", the occupation of Dakar, was officially sanctioned. The target date was to be September 8th.

  The Free French forces available were not large. There were only two battalions (one of them foreign legion), a single company of tanks, and two boxed flights of British supplied Blenheims and Hurricanes. Of necessity the British would have to provide the bulk of the forces, but for political reasons their involvement was to be limited to just the bare minimum in order to guarantee success. The British contingent consisted of four battalions of Royal Marines and some specialised units under Major-General Irwin.

  General de Gaulle was reportedly very angry at the paucity of warships assigned to the operation, seeing it as a lack of resolve on the part of his allies. In fact the naval covering force for "Menace" was quite substantial. It was drawn from the Home Fleet, South Atlantic command, and Force "H" at Gibraltar. Designated Force “M”, it was placed under the command of Vice-Admiral Cunningham.

  Operation “Menace”, Allied order of battle.

  Force “M” (Cunningham).

  Battleships.

  Barham (Queen Elizabeth class)

  Resolution (R class)

  Aircraft-carrier.

  Ark Royal (Ark Royal class)

  Cruisers.

  Australia (Kent class) [late addition]

  Cornwall (Kent class)

  Cumberland (Kent class)

  Delhi (Danae class)

  Devonshire (London class)

  Dragon (Danae class)

  Fiji (Fiji class)

  Destroyers.

  Echo (E class)

  Eclipse (E class)

  Escapade (E class)

  Faulknor (F class)

  Foresight (F class)

  Forrester (F class)

  Fortune (F class)

  Fury (F class)

  Greyhound (G class)

  Inglefield (I class)

  Patrol vessels.

  Commandant Domine (Elan class) [Free French navy]

  Commandant Dubloc (Elan class) [Free French navy]

  Sloops.

  Bridgewater (Bridgewater class)

  Milford (Falmouth class)

  Savorgnan de Brazza (Bougainville class) [Free French navy]

  Boom defence vessel.

  Quannet (Dairycoates class)

  Trawler.

  President Houduce [Free French navy]

  Ground forces (Irwin/De Gaulle).

  Merchant vessels.

  Anadyr— mechanical transport carrier

  Belgravia– foodstuffs

  Casanance—mechanical transport carrier

  Ettrick—1st Battalion 101 Royal Marine brigade

  Fort Lamy—mechanical transport carrier

  Karanja—5th Battalion 101 Royal Marine brigade

  Kenya—2nd Battalion 101 Royal Marine brigade

  Nevada—mechanical transport carrier

  Ocean Coast—mechanical transport carrier

  Pennland—1100 Free French troops

  Sobieski—3rd Battalion 101 Royal Marine brigade

  Westernland—1200 Free French troops plus General de Gaulle.

  Aircraft.

  Ark Royal had a compliment of 30 Swordfish dual-purpose reconnaissance/torpedo-bombers and 24 Skua dual-purpose fighter/dive-bombers. The battleships and four larger cruisers between them carried six Walrus seaplanes for spotting.

  The biggest weakness of Force “M” was that the component warships had been drawn from so many stations and had had little time to exercise together. There were also problems with some of the individual vessels. Barham had only recently been recommissioned and her gunnery left a lot to be desired, which would be a problem if the Vichy garrison resisted. The only carrier available, Ark Royal, would have to provide all the air cover for the operation with a total of 54 low-performance planes.

  Planning for "Menace" began at once, but swiftly became bogged down. An amphibious operation of this magnitude had never been carried out before and staffs struggled with the huge list of details. As late as August 24th three of the British marine battalions were sent to Scapa Flow for a crash course in making opposed beach landings, for which there was an acute shortage of assault landing craft. Knowledge of local conditions (suitable beaches, surf conditions etc.) was sparse. The plan itself changed on an almost daily basis.

  Unsurprisingly the proposed date for the strike proved to be wildly optimistic. The troopships were supposed to make 12 knots and reach Dakar in sixteen days. In fact the ships hired by de Gaulle to carry the mechanical transport could only make 8-9 knots. Moreover a wide detour into the Atlantic had to be made in order to avoid German submarines, imposing a delay of five more days. Another three days were lost in the complexity of loading and fuel constraints meant a refuelling stop of two days would have to be made at Freetown in Sierra Leone. Even so, a slower convoy of five merchants carrying food and mechanical transports had to be sailed on ahead. The strike was rescheduled for 19th September.

  The opening stages of “Operation Menace”. The French destroyer La Flore, impressed into British service, escorts HMS Barham.

  Photograph courtesy Imperial War Museum, London.

  There was also the constant worry that the existence of the operation would "leak" to the Vichy authorities. Security was extremely lax in the Free French forces. Free French officers quite openly toasted the coming operation in restaurants. During embarkation at Liverpool a packing case broke open and scattered hundreds of pro-Free French leaflets headed “To the people of Dakar” throughout the docks. De Gaulle himself purchased a tropical uniform from a London tailor, stating specifically that it was for use in Africa. In contrast, security amongst the British was if anything too tight, as will be seen.

  Moreover, the political basis that underlined operation “Menace” came into question. When the Vichy authorities had broken off diplomatic relations they had expelled two British liaison officers who had been stationed at Dakar. On August 28th these men finally arrived in London and delivered a disquieting report. Their impression of the political situation in Dakar conflicted sharply with the one upon which the operation was based. In their view both the populace and garrison were strongly supportive of the Vichy government. They further pointed out the strength of the defences, and their conviction that any attempt to make a landing would certainly be opposed. If this was true, the prospects for "Menace" were not good.

  Notwithstanding all the practical difficulties and this latest intelligence, the joint commanders decided not to abort the operation. They thought that it was now too late to cancel. B
esides, there had also been good news from Africa. On August 25th Governor Eboue of Chad had declared for Free France, and his example was soon followed by the French Cameroons, Oubanui-Chari (now the Central African Republic) and the Congo. Ubangi and Gabon followed suit soon after, and although Gabon renounced its decision on the 31st following the arrival of a Vichy General and some troops, its capital Libreville was isolated and secured by Free French forces from the Cameroons a few weeks later. It looked like the dream of a Free French Africa was coming true.

  “Menace” gets underway.

  The three separate groups comprising "Menace" finally set sail on August 31st from Scapa Flow, the Clyde and Liverpool. Disaster struck almost immediately. The cruiser Fiji was torpedoed by U-32 and forced to return for repairs. Her place was taken by the cruiser Australia, hurriedly drafted in from the Home fleet. Worse was to follow. There had been no time to issue detailed orders for the operation and staffs had to work flat out to write out all the instructions. Because of the need to maintain radio silence communication between commanders was restricted to Aldis lamp. Conditions in the converted mess decks were cramped and the oppressive heat strained tempers. Knife fights broke out amongst the Free French troops. General Irwin himself tripped over a corpse in the darkened passageway outside of his room.

  Then late on September 11th came the news that a Vichy squadron had passed through the straits of Gibraltar and was at large in the Atlantic. The obvious implication of the appearance of these French ships was that the Vichy government had got wind of "Menace" and were attempting to relieve the Dakar garrison, or perhaps even seize the port for the Germans.