Operation Harpoon Read online

  Naval Warfare

  outside

  The Pacific

  Operation Harpoon

  The precedent for Pedestal.

  By

  M. J. Bourne

  Naval Warfare Outside the Pacific:

  Operation “Harpoon”

  Copyright M J Bourne 1997

  Published 1997 by

  Vandering Publications

  1 Lindal St,

  Barrow-in-Furness

  Cumbria

  LA14 1AY

  Reprinted 2009 by

  Vandering Publications

  29 Dumfries St,

  Barrow-in-Furness

  Cumbria

  LA14 2DA

  All rights reserved.

  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the copyright holder.

  Background to Harpoon.

  The presence in northern Africa of both Italian and British colonies and protectorates guaranteed that there would be fighting there from the moment Italy threw in its lot with the Axis. The contest swung back and forth for over two years, but by early 1942 the Africa Korps were driving up to the Egyptian border. The dazzling prospect of seizing the Nile delta and linking up with German forces in the Ukraine was once more in sight for Axis strategists. The ability of the Afrika Korps to do this, and indeed the ability of the British to stop them, depended ultimately on the timely arrival to the desert armies of adequate supplies of troops, equipment, and above all fuel.

  At first glance it seemed that the Axis powers had the advantage in this race. The geographical position of Italy in the central Mediterranean made British convoy runs from Gibraltar to Alexandria extremely risky. The alternative route, round the Cape of Good Hope and up through the Red Sea and Suez Canal, was safe but very long. In contrast Axis convoys had only a short journey from southern Italy to the main ports in Tunisia. In their way however, stood Malta.

  At the beginning of the war both sides had underestimated the importance of this tiny island. Lying as it did within half-an-hours flying time of the Italian airfields in Sicily, most strategists had written it off as indefensible. Indeed it took some time for the British to be sufficiently aware of its importance to make substantial reinforcements to the garrison. Once strike forces of aircraft and submarines had begun to operate out of Malta in appreciable numbers however, Italian merchant losses en route to Tunisia began to climb alarmingly. At strategy conferences the Italian naval command, Supermarina, increasingly began to call for the threat posed by the island to be eliminated.

  Everyone agreed this would be a desirable course of action, but somehow there always seemed to be more pressing demands for the men and equipment needed. The operation was postponed again and again. Certainly storming Malta would not be easy. The defences were strong and the British would be bound to make the utmost effort to sustain the island if it were attacked. Another factor was that the initial attacks would have to be made by paratroops, and the Germans were wary of such operations following the horrific casualties they had suffered in Crete.

  Rather than invade Malta the decision was taken to neutralise it by concentrated aerial bombardment. Of course the island had been under continuous air attack from the moment Italy had entered the war, but now heavy reinforcements were deployed to intensify the bombardment. In February of 1942 Hitler authorised the redeployment of Fliegerkorps II from Russia to the Mediterranean theatre expressly for the purpose. To further tighten the siege the Germans also commenced a mining campaign of the sea approaches. The British countered by flying in strong reinforcements of Spitfires via carrier sorties, but fighters need fuel and ammunition. The only supplies arriving were small specialist cargoes brought in by submarine. By the middle of May, even though the bombing attacks had slackened off, the island was in dire straits. If Malta was to continue as an offensive base, it was essential that supplies be convoyed in, whatever the risks.

  The British plan to relieve Malta.

  Knowing the need was easier than achieving the end. It was a time of great trial for the Royal Navy. Nearly three years of war had steadily whittled down the number of operational vessels. The end of 1941 had seen the loss of the aircraft-carrier Ark Royal and the battleship Barham to U-boats, and the crippling of the battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth in Alexandria harbour by Italian frogmen. The entry of Japan into the war had forced the creation of an Eastern fleet to defend India. Fear for the Cape routes prompted the War cabinet in London to undertake the emergency countermeasure of invading Madagascar, and the naval forces allocated to this operation were still unavailable. There simply were not enough ships, especially heavy ships, to ward off the threat posed by the Italian navy.

  The situation was so serious that the British decided to run two convoys in the hope of splitting the opposition. If the Axis mustered to check one convoy, the other might still be able to get through. From Alexandria what remained of the Mediterranean fleet would escort eleven merchant ships (code-named Operation Vigorous); while Force H, reinforced by units from the Home Fleet, would escort six merchant ships from Gibraltar (Operation Harpoon). The two were timed to arrive on consecutive days to avoid overloading the harbour facilities at Valetta, as well as to divide the inevitable bombing attacks that would be made.

  The plan for Harpoon was identical in concept to that of similar, successful, convoy runs undertaken from Gibraltar in 1941. The units available were divided into three forces. Force W, under the direct command of Vice-Admiral Curteis, made up the main covering force and contained the heavy ships. These would check any sortie by the Italian fleet and blunt the initial air attacks expected from Sardinia. The capital ships were themselves highly vulnerable however, so they were scheduled to turn back upon reaching the dangerous shallows of the Skerki channel between Cap Bon and Sicily.

  Protection for the final run into Malta would be given by the light units of Force X. The approach through the narrows was timed to be made at night to further lessen the air threat, and long-range fighter protection from Malta itself would be available the following morning. A strong minesweeping force was included to be retained at Malta as a permanent solution to the island’s mine clearance problem.

  Force Y was a refuelling flotilla which would completely oil the smaller ships for the outward voyage, and remain in the western Mediterranean to refuel Force X on the return passage. This also ensured that as few ships as possible would have to call into Gibraltar, which was rife with Axis spies.

  Finally, a screen of four submarines was created to patrol off the main Italian naval bases.

  British Forces.

  Force W. (Covering force) (Vice-Admiral Curteis)

  Battleship

  Malaya (Queen Elizabeth Class)

  Aircraft-Carriers

  Argus (Argus class)

  Airgroup

  No. 807 Squadron (part) with 2 x Fairey Fulmars.

  No. 813 Squadron (elements) with 18 x Fairey Swordfish.

  Eagle (Eagle class)

  Airgroup

  No. 801 Squadron with 12 x Hawker Sea Hurricanes.

  No. 807 Squadron (part) with 4 x Fairey Fulmars.

  No. 813 Squadron (elements) with 4 x Hawker Sea Hurricanes.

  Cruisers.

  Charybdis (Dido class)

  Kenya (Fiji class) (Flagship)

  Liverpool (Southampton class)

  Destroyers.

  Antelope (Acasta class)

  Westcott (Vivacious class)

  Onslow (Onslow class)

  Icarus (Gallant class)

  Escapade (Echo class)

  Wishart (Wolverine class)


  Wrestler (Vivacious class)

  Vidette (Vivacious class)

  Force X (Close escort) Acting Captain Hardy.

  Cruiser.

  Cairo (Ceres class) (Flagship)

  Destroyers—11th Division.

  Bedouin (Tribal class)

  Ithuriel (Gallant class)

  Marne (Lively class)

  Matchless (Lively class)

  Partridge (Onslow class)

  Destroyers—12th Division.

  Badsworth (Hunt class)

  Blankney (Hunt class)

  Middleton (Hunt class)

  Oakley (Hunt class) (On loan to the Polish navy as the Kujawiak)

  Minesweepers—17th Minesweeper Flotilla.

  Hebe (Halcyon class)

  Hythe (Bangor class)

  Rye (Bangor class)

  Speedy (Halcyon class)

  Motor Launches—6th Motor Launch Flotilla.

  No.’s 121, 134, 135, 168, 459 & 462.

  (all 112ft 'B' Class boats)

  Force Y (Refueling group)

  Fleet Oiler.

  Brown Ranger.

  Corvettes.

  Geranium (Flower class)

  Coltsfoot (Flower class)

  Merchant Ships (Commander Pilditch).

  Freighters.

  Burdwan (6,000 tons).

  Chant (5,500 tons) (American)

  Orari (10,500 tons).

  Tanimbar (8,000 tons) (Dutch)

  Troilus (7,500 tons).

  Tanker.

  Kentucky (5,500 tons) (American)

  Attached forces.

  Minelayer.

  Welshman (Abdiel class).

  Submarines.

  P-42 (Unbeaten class)

  P-43 (Unbeaten class)

  P-44 (Unbeaten class)

  P-211 (Saracen class)

  The escort available was hardly ideal. Apart from the ad-hoc nature of the force (most of the ships had been collected from several stations specifically for the operation) the vessels themselves had weaknesses. Malaya was old and had not been refitted for some time. Of more concern were the two carriers. Both were old, slow and poorly armed. Neither had armour protection and they carried very few aircraft. Together they could put up no more than ten fighters at once, patently inadequate to beat off the mass air attacks expected. The aircraft themselves did not have the greatest performance, and were further hampered in their protective duties by the fact that neither of the carriers had radar or modern fighter-direction apparatus, making it difficult for them to co-ordinate air patrols.

  The biggest weakness, however, was strategic. Force X, entrusted for the final run into Malta, was simply too light for the task. It was widely appreciated that the Axis had the capability to confront any convoy with superior surface units, but it was assumed that the main opposition would come from aircraft, on the erroneous basis that the Italian navy had not acted decisively to block convoys in the past. Force X was well equipped with AA guns, but less well prepared for surface action. Only the five big fleet destroyers fielded 4.7" calibre armament. The rest of the escorts carried old 4" guns, and the small Hunt class destroyers were not fitted with torpedoes.

  Moreover, in spite of precautions, it did not take the Axis long to realise that a major operation was in the offing. Rumours of steamships about to leave Alexandria for Malta had been revealed by POW’s as early as June 2nd. More suspiciously, in order to try and blunt the Axis response, the RAF raided Italian bases (particularly Taranto) several times just before the convoy entered the Mediterranean. Italian agents reported that Force H was at sea with a convoy on June 11th. At first the Italians thought that this might be a diversion, but when their air reconnaissance confirmed that the convoy was heading towards Malta all stations were put on alert.

  As far as ships were concerned this did not amount to much. The Italians were indeed planning to rely on aircraft to deal with threats from the west. The bulk of the Italian surface fleet was committed against the "Vigorous" operation in the east. Only the 7th cruiser division based at Cagliari could be spared to face the Harpoon convoy. The Italians had planned to patrol the Skerki channel area with three squadrons of motor torpedo boats, but in the event unusually heavy seas prevented their deployment.

  Italian naval forces (Admiral da Zara).

  Cruisers — 7th Cruiser division.

  Eugenio di Savoia (D'Aosta class) (Flagship)

  Raimondo Montecuccoli (Montec class)

  Destroyers.

  Ugolino Vivaldi (Navigatori class)

  Malocello (Navigatori class)

  Premuda (modified Dubrovnik class)

  Oriani (Oriani class)

  Ascari (Aviere class)

  The Premuda was the ex-Yugoslavian destroyer Dubrovnik, captured by the Italians in April 1941 and extensively modified.

  The Italians also allocated ten submarines off Malta and thirteen off North Africa, although their effectiveness was limited by the clear and shallow conditions of the Mediterranean. Besides, the British had a good idea of their patrol areas because they had cracked the Axis Ultra naval codes.

  The position with aircraft was somewhat better for the Axis.

  Sardinian air bases.

  77 Fighters.

  63 Torpedo bombers.

  35 Bomber/Reconnaissance.

  Sicilian air bases.

  102 Fighters.

  14 Torpedo Bombers.

  56 Bomber/Reconnaissance

  The Germans had fewer resources. With Fleigerkorps II having been now mostly withdrawn, the Luftwaffe in Sicily was confined to one group of Ju-88 bombers and one of Me-109 fighters. All told the Italians had nearly 350 combat aircraft in the western Mediterranean area, but serviceability was appalling low - less than 50% - and there was an acute shortage of ammunition, especially torpedoes.

  The main strike bomber was the tried and trusted SM-79, which had been blooded in the Spanish Civil war. As a torpedo delivery system it was quite dangerous, but was horribly vulnerable itself when making attack runs. The Italians also fielded a few examples of an SM-79 development, the SM-84. Finally Sicily also boasted a single squadron of Italian manned JU-87 "Stukas", recently trained by the Luftwaffe in the technique of dive-bombing.

  The principal reconnaissance aircraft was the Cant Z-501 seaplane, a reasonable design but hampered by short range. They were also tactically misused as high level bombers, an attack method already proven to be almost completely ineffective against mobile maritime targets. The main fighters used were the Mc-200 and Re- 2000, with a few CR-42 biplanes still in service in Sardinia. The Sicilian airfields also had a proportion of the newer Mc-201 and Re-2001, which were faster and more maneuverable because of their use of German liquid-cooled low-drag engines.

  The Action.

  The Harpoon convoy sailed from the Clyde on 5th June. The escorts refuelled at Gibraltar in relays, and the convoy was at full strength at 0800 on 12th June, by which time it had passed through the straits and was sailing into the Mediterranean at a speed of 12-13 knots. The weather was perfect, the sea glassy calm and the sky very clear and sunny - all bad for the defenders. Clear skies made it easy for Axis reconnaissance aircraft to spot the convoy. Conversely, sunlight produced glare and made it difficult to spot approaching aircraft at long range. Calm water made for poor asdic conditions.

  Throughout June 13th Axis planes regularly made contact with the convoy and shadowed it, in spite of the efforts of fighters from Argus and Eagle. The weaknesses of the two carriers were already becoming apparent. The best way for carriers to launch aircraft is to turn into the wind. What little there was on this fine, calm Mediterranean spring day was blowing west to north-west, from astern, which meant that to quickly launch fighters the carriers would effectively be detaching themselves from the convoy. Being old and slow, it took them a long time to catch up. During this time they were vulnerable and would need escorts themselves, which weakened the guard round the transports.

  In order to try and minimise these disadvantage
s Curteis adopted an unusual formation. The merchant ships were deployed in two lines, the port one headed by Kenya, the starboard one by Liverpool. Three motor launches were assigned at the rear of each column, where they could double as rescue ships. Malaya, escorted by Welshman, brought up the rear. Each of the carriers was assigned an AA cruiser and a destroyer (Charybdis and Vidette for Argus, Cairo and Wishart for Eagle) and ordered to manoeuvre separately to port. The remaining destroyers and minesweepers were deployed in a conventional screen around the convoy, but at the unusually great distance of three to three and a half miles from the main body. In this way they would better be able to protect the carriers if they detached. They would also be able to engage aircraft for longer and with both broadsides.

  Meanwhile, the Italians had their own problems. The low endurance of their reconnaissance planes made it difficult for them to maintain continuous contact. It was for this reason that an air strike launched at 19:30 from Sardinia failed to find the convoy. Moreover, the Italian planes claimed to see Welshman sailing ahead of the convoy (she was not actually due to detach until the Skerki channel). Acting on this erroneous information, the 7th cruiser division sailed from Cagliari to attempt an interception north of Tunisia. On the way they ran into the specially deployed British submarine patrol line. P-211 spotted the Italians, but could not get into position to attack and could only radio in the contact. P-43 was able to make an attack but she missed. On receipt of the submarine contact reports, strikes were also prepared using Malta based bombers.